Abstract: While it is aften argued that U.S. military strategy has gone through substontiol chonges over the post three decodes, it is not so cleor lf. this is so, or why this should be so. Some chonges in the real strotegic problern of the west rnust be considered, including the growth of the Soviet nucleor orsenol. Chonges in our perception of the problern moy be ot least os irnportont, however, anid some possibilities of 'Finlondisotion'. Chonges in the West's opportunities must also be considered, including 'limited nucleor war', ond o totally conventionol defense. Finolly to be considered ore the bureoucrotic motivotions of those odvocoting ony such chonges in western rnilitory postures, oll of which suggest thot current policies moy still be better thon the alternatives.
lt is often soid thot United $totes strotegy with regord to the opplicotions of possible use of nucleor weopons hos gone through some kind of massive evolution over the post four decodes, rother thon stoying constont.
1 ls this so, or would it be more occurate to conclude thot the chonges hove reolly been small, cornpored to the endu ring ottributes of such strotegy?
If there hove indeed been chonges, whot could exploin thern? Are chonges to be regorded rnoinly os rational responses to s hift s in the objectlve problern the United $totes foces, in protecting its own territory ond thot of its mast valued ollies? Or ore such chonges somehow less 'rational', ond more 'politicol', reflecting the su bjective feelings of the publies thot matter on either side of the Atlontic, or the speciol interests ond preferences of porticiponts in the decision process?
This orticle wiJI otternpt to sort out the natu r e of the strotegy changes thot hove occurred, ond the irnportonce of these chonges os compored with whot hos not been altered. We will consider alternative theories of whot could exploin such chonge, controsting whot would seern like more purposeful or rational decision -making, with what would be seen os rnore subjective and politicol.
Hos there indeed been some kind of mojor shift, from an Americon commitment to o 'massive retoliotion' hitting of cities ond civilion torgets in the event of o nucleor war (in the 'ossured destruction' of whot toter become enshrined os mutual ossured destruction -MAD), to something more colculotedly intended to strike ot the other side' s militory copobilities rother thon volue items, the supposed. result of the Integration of nucleortorgeting plons in the Single Integreted Operotionol Plan (SIOP)? Allegedly, there hos been o further refinement of nucleor torgeting plonning in the PD-59 study done during the Corter Administration, ond then still more with NSDD-13 in the Reagan-Administration 2 , but whot hos this ent ire progression then consisted of? Critics of such alleged shifts in nucleor torgeting would argue thot the eitles of Eu rope and Russia ond North Americo will be destroyed in ony event, os the damoge in the colloteral side-effects of ony use of nucleor weopons todoy will erobably be just os bad os when such weopons were aimed directly ot cities. 3
Changes In the Real Problem?
One form of explonotion for ony change thot is olleged to hove occurred would stress the growth in Soviet nuclear forces over the decodes, o growth which hos markedly chonged the rotios of the nucleor destructive power controlled by the two major ollionces. In 1948, the United $totes possessed oll the nuclear weopons of the world, so thot its rotio here with the U. 5. 5. R . had to be infinite. After the Soviets showed their fir st nucleor weapons in Washington found destroying oll the strike).
1949, this rotio could never be the some ogoin (unless some morvelously effective woy of preempting and Soviet strategic forces in o U.S. Counterforcefirst
In subsequent yeors, the U.S.S.R . is then often described os hoving moved forward to a position of 'pority', ond then of 'superiority' where its posltion in 1950 or 1955 was ollegedly still one of 'inferiority'. But which ore the meoningful turning points here? Is there anything that is so relevant obout o phrose like superiority or inferiority, once o monopoly of nuclear weoponry hos been replaced by a duopoly?
Henry Kissinger wrote o best-selling book entitled Nucleor Weapons ond Foreign Policy in 1957, some thirty yeors ogo, orguing thot the United $totes could no Ionger rely on massive retoliation threots ogoinst Soviet cities, os the way of keeping Soviet conventionol forces from sweeping ocross western Europe; for Soviet nuclear forces could now devostate U.S. cities in retoliotion (Kissinger 1957 ). Kissinger did not bother to ottribute ony 'pority' to the Soviet nucleor strotegic forces in the comporison with those of the United $totes. The important factor was instead simply thot Americon cities were vulnerable, ond even o ten to one rotio of U. $. to Soviet nucleor strength would not hove shielded such Americon eitles ogoinst total devostotion.
Kissinge r wo r ned , if we were to heod off o Soviet attock on the NATO countries in Europe, that some plausible western response was needed which might blunt a Soviet advonce without escolating to any kind of nuclear dest r uction of Moscow and other Soviet eitles. The copability for such o response hos never been deployed, but the Soviet ground force ottack on West Germony has not come. lf Kissinger was telling us t h irty yeors ago thot the door was wide open for Soviet aggression, ond such aggression has not occu r red, could it be thot his anolysis was wrang?
In ony event, Henry Kissinger's onolysis was thot the p roblern of the credibility of extended deterrence, the problern of reossuring freedom west of the Eibe River, was ol r eody at hand, with no fu r ther aogmentotions of Soviet militory power really being needed to pose the risk. lf he toter was to bose his ossessment of risk on t he growth of the Soviet orsenol (Kissinge r 1979), his eorlier work does not loy the logicol groundwor k for this .
Perhops our intuition s, carrying over from eorlier periods of conventionol warfare, still suggest that o Soviet nuclear force 20% bigger than ours wou ld count for more tho n o force 20% smoller. But the reolities of mu t ual deterrence hove olwoys hod to chollenge such eorlier intuitions. The real yardstick of comparison has hod to be, ever since 1949, the number of opposing nucleor worheods that could reoch ou r eitles. Once o significont numbe r of Americon eitles were vulnerable to this kind of ottock, doubts could immediately be raised, quite logicolly ond rationally, os to whether t he United St otes could in any woy opply nuclear weopons to the shielding of its friends and allies on the continent of Europe. 4 But, given that such rational doubts hove been roised, some onswers hove nonetheless been found, so thot Soviet plonners con by no meons count on exploiting the conventional worfore odvantages their numbers ond geographicol position offer them.
Those who worry about the totals of nucleor forces on each side sometimes por t roy the evolution of the rela t ionship os follows:
American monopoly American superiority parity Soviet superiority . .
lf the anolyst is not careful obout thinking through the reolities, he might then be led to see o pendulum motion here, leading to .
Soviet monopoly ! !
There are two important points to be made here, in any rational analysis af the situation. The first is that manopoly for the Soviets, or for either side, is now una ttainable. /11\oscow will never be as secure ogainst nuclear attack, in t he event of a war in Europe, as Washington was in 1948 .
The second point is that the lass of such a monopoly was indeed the most important of oll the changes in nuclear situation. The difference between superiority, for elther side, and parity, is terribly minor, when compared with this e lementary difference between monopoly and even the beginnings of nuclear duopoly. Our problems of nuclear strategy , of making American responses credible so that Europe would not be prone to Soviet military conquest (and so that Europeon economic resources would not be drained away by preparations for a conventional defense), thus began in 1949 with the fir s t Soviet acquisition of nuclear warheads. lt is truly debatable whether the problern has changed since then, or whether the solutions have changed.
Looking at the western security problern in a rational way, t herefore, in terms of the requi rements of defense, it is hardly clear that changes have been req uired, or that our problems are worse today than two decades ago.
Changes In the Perceived Problem?
If the rational case for a shift in strategy, in face of the growth of Soviet nuclear forces, is not so overpowering, there may nonetheless be some political cases to be made, as lang as any ordinary Americans or Europeans continue to be influenced by any of the earlier intuitions in which the camparisans of force numbers matter. What if West Europeans are intimidated by an apparent improvement in how the Soviets would do in any nuclear war, in terms of who 'wins' such a war militarily? The 'victory' in a nuclear war may indeed be meaningless; but it can be politically significant if anyone changes his peacetime behavior because of how he anticipates this variable. What if Americans are intimidated by the prospects of losing the counterforce exchange in any future battle of nuclear missiles? What if West Eu ropeans are not intimidated by t he illusions here, but intimidated by the possibility that the Americans might be intimidated? 5
The prospect of 'Finlandization' can mean a variety of things, but it generally suggests that the free-election countries sitting in the possible path of Soviet military forces may have to be fearful that any U. S. cou nter to such Soviet stren gth will be neutralized or rever sed. Becau se an American president might no Ionger be ready to inflict nuclear destruction on the Soviet Union (since the U.S.S.R. can do the same on the United States), he might hypothetically acquiesce in the Soviet conquest of We s tern Europe.
As the solution to this problern of possible Finlondizotion 1 the United Stotes could invest heovily in conventionol defenses. Or 1 to ovoid the dilerrmo of hoving to choose between suicidol nucleor escolotion ond object surrender 1 the United Stotes could insteod seek ofter counterforce opplicotions of nucleor weopons. This would be to seek woys to fight o nucleor war without destroying the torgets most volued to the Soviet leadership (hence retoining some dissuosion for ony Soviet strikes ot Americon populotion centers). It would be to seek woys to use nucleor weopons to bl unt the Soviet obility to win either o conventionol or nucleor war. By denying Moscow the prospect of victory 1 the deterrence of ony Soviet move westward would be reinforced ond restored 1 ond olong with it would be restored the morole ond self-confidence of individual West Europeon s ond Americons. 6
It must be stressed thot we hove shifted from discussing the reolities of nucleor war ond extended nucleor deterrence here 1 to discussing the perceptions held by human beings 1 perceptions which moy not occord with reolity 1 but which hove o real politicol significonce on their own . In r eolity 1 it is very difficult to predict how o nucleor exchonge limited to certoin oreos of Europe 1 or onother nucleor exchonge devoted entirely to counterforce torgeting ocross the entire Nor t hern Hemisphere 1 would come out in terms of 'who won' such o war. lt is much eosier to predict thot ony such exchonge 1 even with the best-loid plons 1 ond greotest efforts ot coreful oiming1 will impose tremendous colloterol domoge on oll the civilion ossets thot ore onywhere neor the bottle oreo.
lt would be contended here thot none of this hos chonged since 1955 1 when the first 'tocticol nucleo r weopons' were deployed into West Germony. If the rational problern hos not chonged in ony of its significont porometers 1 however 1 the possibility remoins thot perceptions hove chonged 1 or will chonge 1 such thot even o ten percent increose in the Soviet nucleor orsenol which mode no militory difference might one doy moke o mojor politicol difference.
NATO Ieaders hove o real duty to mointoin o politicol climote whereby their democrotic election systems ore not intimidoted by the prospect of Soviet militory power. If the eorlier onolysis of Pierre Gollois or Henry Kissinger comes to be widely occepted 1 thot no Americon Ieader would ever pl unge his own country into an exchonge of nucleor destruction simply becouse Europe was being subjected to Soviet rule 1 then this imoge would become troublesome by itself 1 even if the reolity was very much the opposite 1 very much thot no Soviet Ieader would ever dore risk the Americon responses if he sent his tank columns forword. lf o modificotion of this imoge hos won occeptonce 1 by which an Americon nucleor response remoins credible 1 but only becouse it will be designed for militory ond counterforce purposes 1 ovoiding countervolue ottocks os much os possible 1 then we might ogoin encounter a parallel problern of intirnidation, whenever analysts and menon-the street began concluding that such o Counterforce exchange (because of an enhoncement of Soviet force totals) now no Ionger could favor the West.
lt would then rnake less difference if the reality were that such a counterforce exchonge had ~ 'favo red' the West, becau se too rnuch darnage had been inflicted on the Soviets. The irnportant point is that irnages take on a life of their own here; if a false antidote had been accepted for a false problern, an erosion of this antidote would seern to bring the problern back to life.
Changes In the Opportunities?
A first 'rational' argurnent for changes in U.S. nuclear strategy over the post two decades has thus been that the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal somehow reguired such a change; a deterrence that would have worked when the Soviets had no atomic bornbs rnight not work once they had some, or a deterrence which worked when the Soviets had a rnarkedly srnaller nuclear orsenal than the United $totes rnight not work once their arsenal was equal to, or greater than, that of the United $totes .
A secend 'rational' argurnent for such changes in strategy works out frorn a different physical base, taking seriously the alleged irnprovements that rnay now be fossible in western weapons options, either conventional or nuclear options.
What if conventional weapons can be substantially irnp roved, so that they would have rnuch rnore of a chance of blunting any Soviet orrnared force advance? And what if such weapons can be very carefully aimed in combat, to greatly reduce whatever colloterol darnage would be irnposed on the surrounding civilians?
Sirnilarly, what if nuclear weopons can be rnodified and refined so that they will be targeted to blunt any Soviet advance, sirnply stopping Moscow's forces frorn reaching their goals? And what if such nuclear weapons can be rnuch more carefully aimed, with the use of smoller warheads, so t hat the warst of the destruction norrnally involved in nuclear seenarios is avoided?
In either case, one would have a powerful argurnent, in terrns of opportunity, rather than requirement, for shifting to a new kind of strategy, producing o deterrence which rnight be more effective, and producing a warfighting policy which would be rnuch more productive, and rnuch less destructive, if deterrence were indeed one day to fail.
Lirnited Nuclear Warfare
We rnight begin here with the temptations of the second possibility, the use of nucleor weapons in a more limited ond refined way, discussing the possibilities as weil as the pitfalls, and we will then shift to the canventional warfare options .
While the shift from 1950's nuclear strategies to t he pla n s of the McNamora SIOP in the 1960's, and t hen of PD-59 and NSDD-13, rnight seern a steady progression in the direction of hitting Counterfor ce targets, and of avoidance of countervetue destruction, there is at least one problern of confusion in how we Interpret the history here. Massive retaliation moy be how we remernber the Eisenhower nuclear war plans, but American historians rurrmoging through documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) often offer us the star tling revelation that American plans, even in the 1950's, were rnuch mare heavily counterforce, and not sirnply the destr uction of Soviet eit les. 8 ( Soviet eitles would indeed have been destroyed, but as the collateral side-effect of an effort to cripple t he Soviet abili t y to wage wa r , with the sheer size of nuclear warheads pres urnably precluding any separat ion of the two kin ds of destructive irnpact.) lt has thus oll along seemed logical and rational, to the U.S. Air Force torget planners in Omoha, that any opportunity for disarrning and disabling the Soviet rnilitary forces should be pursued. The ernphasis of this under McNamaro or Schlesinger or Herold Brown or Cespar Weinberget was thus hardly new. What rnight rathe r have been new were rasier expectations of the ability to hit exactl y the r ight rnilitar y targets , an d (in face of the Soviet ability to hit America eitles) of the ability to ovoid des t roying ot her Soviet targets that the leadership in Moscow rnight val ue.
Variations on how to accornplish this have lncluded uses of nuclear weapons only within specified combat zones, i.e. perhops only along the front in Centrat Europe, or only west of the Soviet border with Polend, and also uses oll across the two superpowers' home te r ritories, but still aimed to ovoid the unnecessary destruction of civilian life. 9 The biggest problern with this kind of 'rational exploitation of opportunity' comes on th is Ietter count, whether the collateral damage in any use of nuclear weopons con ever be held down so that the other side could oppreciate it, i.e. is the 10 opportunity really there?
The winds blow frorn west t o east in Europe; ony use of n uclear weapons only in East and West Gerrna ny, or only in Polend, would soon enough deposit radioacti ve fellout in s ide the U. S. S. R. os weil. Pilot s ond artiller ymen and rnissile crews can make mistakes, or con behove insubor dinately, and other posslbilities would thus emerge by which eitles within the U.S.S.R. would come tobe struck. Where counterforce targeting had been extended within the U.S.S.R. itself, even with the best efforts to oim carefully at targets and to hold down the collateral domage, the likely casualty toll would quickly mount into the millions, because of where some perfectly legitimote Soviet military targets are locoted, and ogain because of the winds dispe r sing the radioactive fellout that surely would result.
Ever since 1955, American military planners have been claiming to see possibilities of limited nuclear war, cases where nuclear weapons could be used without an escalation to all-out war. Over the same three decades, skeptics in the United Stetes and Western Europe have again and ogain questioned whether this is at oll possible. They have been joined in these expressions of skepticism by spokesmen for the U.S.S.R. (who, of course, cannot so readily be assumed to be rendering their true opinions and honest analysls, but rather may be serving their own national purposes, in pretending to see some things as possible and other s as lmpos sible ) .
lt would indeed be 'rational' to use nuclear weapons in combat after the Soviets had c r ossed the Eibe River, l!. such weapons were going to be very helpful in pushing the aggressors back, and if the domage caused by such weapons would not be os horrendaus as we normally calculate it to be. But the newest of theater nuclear options do not really seem to be much mare promising here than the earlier projects for limited nuclear war 1 and one must suspect that some kind of meta-rational game has been played here, and is still being played.
The United Stetes nuclear weapons deployed to West Germany may thus indeed still be 'tripwires', intended to show the Soviets that nuclear escalation will indeed occur 1 as part of the 'flexible response' to any Warsaw Poet conventlonal ground force Invasion that did not seem stoppable by con ventional means.
All the officers and planners involved pretend, to themselves and to others, to be something other than tripwires, but this is indeed to make them more plausible as tripwires, in seeming to be intent on accomplishing something else. lf the nuclear forces deployed into any plausible Soviet aggression path were explicitly to admit to being there merely to dispell doubts about U. S. nuclear escalation, they would in effect amplify and call atten tion to such doubts. When such forces instead profess to be intent, in light of such doubts, to be merely applying nuclear weapons in a manner that will not escolate beyond the theater 1 the risks thot such an escolation will follow are very much enhanced. The premise of 'limited nuclear war' seems completely unrealistic, a kind of folly on the part of those who are allegedly bosing their plan upon it; bu t the Soviets have to take seriously the rlsk that western mllltary planner are actually occepting this folly.
lf the Soviets connot be counted upon to be impressed ond deterred by Americon resolve for the protection of NATO ollies, they moy thus be counted upon to be impressed ond deterred by such operotionol folly. Americons counting upon o limited nucleor response to o Soviet conventionol oggression would plunge the world into the warst of o thermonucleor World War 111, ond Gorbochev would therefore choose never to lounch the Soviet conventionol oggressions in the firs t ploce.
This omounts to yet onother variant on the t heme of the 'rotionolity of irrotionolity'. Americon policy, ofter war hod broken out, would be bodlyinformed ond irrational, ond counterproductive for oll concerned; but hoving this in ploce in odvonce of war, so os to deter war becouse the Soviets ore owore of it, moy be very productive ond rational. 11
Conventionol Defense
Some of the proposed new 'limited' opplicotions for nucleor worheods ore bosed on greotly enhonced occurocies in the bollistic ond cruise missiles thot ore to deliver them, perhops moking such worheods much more effective ot incopocitoting the enemy's militory structure, ond correspondingly less destructive to the civilion structures thot oll sides might prefer to protect. Yet such an enhoncement of occurocies begs o question, for with the greotest of occurocy, the militory torget in question might be hit weil enough with o conventionol worheod . The alternative to plons for limited nucleor war, o substitute for massive retoliotion over oll these xeors, would thus be preporotions for o more effective conventionol defense. 12 lt is beyond doubt thot such o use of conventionol worheods would impose for less deoth ond destruction thon ony corresponding use of nucleor worheods . Hoving noted this, one should not be too quick to forget the Ievels of domoge inflicted during World War II; ony ovoidonce of o nucleor World War 111 which quickly focilitoted someone's launehing o conventionol repeot of World War II in Centrol Europe might strike mony people os no borgoin. Yet, if conventionol weopons could also be enhonced in their militory effectiveness, so os to strengthen the defense of NATO ogoinst ony Soviet conventionol ottock, might this not be the best of oll worlds, mointoining or enhoncing the deterrence of war in the first ploce, ond substontiolly decreosing the costs of war, if war nonetheless occurred? We would hove o rational policy here ex post 1 as weil os ex onte, os the newest in militory techniques ond plonning were opplied to better the situotion of oll concerned.
Hopes ore thus sometimes put forword thot new anti-t ank guided mun!tioi'H\ (ATGM) will be oble to render the tank vulnerable ond o bsolete, thus removing from the militory bolonce o weopons system in which the Soviets hove invested heovily even since World War II, o weopons · sy$tem which also olwoys seems to fovor mobility ond the offensive, rother thon eosing crisis stobility ond reinforcing the defense. Similor hopes ore affered for conventionol worheod opplicotions of cruise missiles, perhops ollowing for the destruction of every bridge crossing the rivers in Polond, t hereb y very bodly hondicopping ony Soviet Invasion thot hod been lounched in Germony. Ot he r hopes ore put forword for new kinds of moneuver strotegy, ond new kinds of NATO ormy formotions, combining the tocticol wisdom of the commonders of World War II with the lotest in weopons options, oll with the gool of reliobly denying Moscow ony opportunities for o militory Invasion of West Germony ond the rest of the NATO oreo.
Whot con be soid ogoinst such alternatives to massive retoliotion postures , or to the limited nucleor worfore options which ore oll too likely to become massive retoliotion, becouse their plonners hove underestimoted the colloterol darnage thot would be imposed in the very most restroined of n ucleor ottock s?
We hove olreody noted one worrisome inherent possibility: ony such opprooch, by reducing the darnage inflicted if war were to occur, mlght somewhot enhonce the willingness of Moscow to try such o war, to gomble thot it might goin some territory, thot lt might ot lost 'liberote' the workers of Frankfurt or Amsterdom.
A different cotegory of considerotions hos pertoined to the economic ond human costs of preporing o more odequote conventionol defense . Will there not be o greot economic droin here, o woste of economic resources in preventing wors, wors thot could hove been pr evented much more cheoply by continuing to rely on nucleor deterrence? lf young men hove to serve Ionger terms of militory service, this is hordly o goin for society os o whole. The economic progress ochieved by West Germony ond oll of We stern Europe ofter the 1940's was o boon for oll monkind; would such progress hove been pos sible if n ucleor weopon s hod never been in vented, if the United Stotes ond its NATO portners hod possessed no other options but mounting o conventionol defense system, or trusting the Intention s of Stolin ond hls s ucces sor s? 13
Finolly, os perhops the most serious procticol problern in o shift to conventionol defenses for Western Europe, such defenses would rely heovily on the lotest in technology, roislng the prospect thot meosure ond countermeosure would continuolly be overturning eoch other. The flux in electronic ond other militory technologies is now very rapid, ond ony defense which seemed relioble for one holf-decode might thus be in doubt ogoin for the next. Our problems here ore illustroted oll too weil in the short bursts of worfore between Israel ond its Arob enemies in the Mid dle Eost, where some modern weopons systems work very weil, ond ot hers do not work ot oll, with the technicol representotives ('tech reps') of the American or Soviet weapons suppliers then frantically racing araund, trying to ry,redy the defects befare another half-day of combat is completed.
The lotest in anti-tank weapons, or in su rface-to-air missiles, might indeed favor the defensive, in that they offer very high kill probabilities wherever a target has been identified, as the task is spotting a metol object against a non-metallic background. When a target is moving, it is presumably eosier to spot than when it is sitting still, and this would then seem to fovor the defense, the side sitting still, rother than favoring the force which had elected to take the aggressive initiative, thrusting across boundaries ond lines of dernarcation. Ye t the sheer unpredictability of such systems leaves us still very much in doubt abou t how any conventionol war would run between NATO and the Warsaw Poet. Depending an a great number of variables, technological ond otherwise, such a war could see Communist forces very rapidaly reaching the Rhine River or beyond, or very quickly being stalernated, or even could see NATO forces very soon penetrating deep into East Germany or Czechoslovakia .
We are doomed to live with a rnajor paradox with regord to the predictability of nucleor and conventionol wors, os we opproach the end of the twentieth century. We hove hod mony conventionol wors in the pos t, ond rnany rounds of conventionol worfore even since nucleor weopons were introduced ot the end of World War II. But we ore reolly not ot oll good ot predicting how such wors will turn out, who will control the disputed territory ot the end, who will lose the most forces ond militory copobility as t he shots ore exchanged. By cantrast, we have never hod ony experience with a nucleor war (o war in which both sides used nucleor weopons); but one ospect of such o war is eminently predictable, t hot the countervalue darnage, the destruction and death imposed in such o war, will surely be horrendous.
lf the people ond governments of Western Europe ond of the United Stotes, ond of South Korea, ore thus looking for some certointies, os they must confront the inherent possibility of o Soviet military invosion, it is altogether possible thot they will s till find more of such certointy in nucleor deterrence than in conventionol deterrence.
Bureoucrotic Motivations
With both nucleor and conventional systems, there ore thus rational arguments thot could be odvonced for such preparotions, ond rational arguments agoinst. Yet there ore also, of cour se, some politicol ond metarational foctors a t work here, ploying on important additional role for e xploining when such plons drow more enthusiosm, ond when they drow less.
The simple bureoucrotic politics of ony militory group, ond of the civilions it works with, will 5ee some enthusiosm developed for such projects once they ore lounched . 1 Armies moy not be so effective os tripwires if they odmit openly to be tripwires, o considerotion olreody noted obove. Such ormies would also not get to be os !arge, or os replete with promotions ond oppropriotions, if they odmitted to being nothing more thon o linkoge for massive retoliotion. Ever since the 1950's, therefore, the United Stotes Army, ond the tocticolly-oriented portians of the U. S. Air Force, hove thus been spokesmen for the possibllities of, ond preparations for, limited war.
Perhops such wors ore proposed to be fought in o limited monner with toctical nuclear worheads, os advocated by Henry Kissinger in his first book. lf outside onolysts wo uld indeed conclude this possibility to be substantially unworkable ond unreolistic, the militory officers involved, ond the civilians ossigned to procuring the necessory weaponry, will nonetheless promote the possibility ond rodlote o belief in it.
Perhops such wors would insteod be proposed to be fought only with conventional weopons, thus more surely to ovoid escolotion to o World War 111, or the destructlon of the very West Germony territory thot was being contested. Agoin, the militory officers involved will rodlote o 'can do' ottitude about their assigned tosk.
Every portion of every government may, therefore, be suspected of pushing it s politicol or coreer corrmitments forward, in ways that blur or interfere with really efficient or rational analysis.
The U. S. Air Force, in its planning for Counterforce uses of nuclear weapons rother than countervalue, similarly hos followed the paths of 's t rategic planning' thot justify ond induce a lorger air force. lf t he only tosk of such Strategie Air Corrmond ( SAC) weapons was t o destroy the cities of the Soviet Union (mony who believe in nuclear deterrence would have concluded, from the 1950's oll through to the 1980's, that this was indeed the only task that mattered), then o considerobly smoller air force would have sufficed.
Preporotions for policies other than massive retaliation thus amount to an opportunity for more extensive, ond more expen s ive, militory preparotions. There is probably no political process in the world where such a difference would not be significant to oll the porties involved, in way s which distort and twist the strategic debote. The kinds of government officers who fovor lower militory expenditures, whether it be Eisenhower in the United Stotes, or oll the various governments in the West Europeon NATO stotes since the 1950's, will fovor o continued relionce on the threot of nuclear escolotion. The operotors of their militory estoblishments hove typicolly fovored other opprooches, ond greoter spending.
The Democrotic Electorol Process
As o final kind of foctor which is more politicol ond less rational, we must contend, throughout the West, with the election process. The opposition porties must find things to criticize in the policies of the incumbents, if they ore to escope o 'me-too' imoge, if they ore to hove ony chonce of defeoting the incumbents. When the opposition then wins an election, os with the Democrots in the United Stotes in 1960, or the Republicons in 1980, it will be necessory for them then to mointoin an imoge of 'improvements' ond 'better ideos', by finding some new policies to implement, by finding some chan ges to moke.
This phenomenon of 'chonge for chonge's soke' con sometimes be very superficial, os the nomencloture of defense documents is chonged from PD ('Presidentiol Directive') to NSDD ('National Secu rity Oecision Oirective'). At other points it con involve o more mojor shift to new nucleor weapons ond torgeting schemes, or new conventional weopons and torgeting schemes; yet if these chonges moy be very real, they moy not olwoys be so desiroble.
Such 'chonge for chonge's soke' is thus somewhot the bias of o politicol democrocy. lt moy similarly be the ortificiol bios of other very importont elements of ony democracy, the press, ond the ocodemic world. One does not sell newspopers, and one does not copture ottention os o professor, by soying thot oll is weil with current orrangements. One rather must finci something to criticize, ond find some chonges to propose. One must conjure up orguments why yesterday's preporotions for defense or deterrence will no Ionger wor k tomor row.
In Conclusion
It is entirely plausible that the arrongements thot worked yesterdoy con indeed werk very weil tomorrow, ond thot ony changes in such orrangements will be chonges for the worse, rother thon for the better. Yet we are likely, for oll the reosons .noted, to keep on discussing 'trends' and 'chonges' in strotegic policy here, and perhops to keep on fooling ou~ selves on how much further 'chonge' is needed.
Whot is 'rational' obout our hondling of our security problems will alwoys hove to interoct with whot is more 'political' or 'psychologicol'; whot is substantive will be intertwined with whot is procedurol. The confusions this produces hordly stand in the woy of a successful resolution of our dlfflculties; rother they may keep us from ever ocknowledging the successes when we encounter them.
Not es
For some Interpretations stressing the changes, see Huntington (ed. ) 1982.
2 Thls is the progression outlined in Martel/Sovoge 1986.
3 A goad exomple of the perspective by which nothing significont hos chonged can be found in Je rvis 1984.
4 For the same argument, justifylng French nuclear weapons, see Goilais 1961.
5 The posslbilities of an intimidatlon of the West Europeon demacracies as a result of changing nuclear force ratlos ls discussed in Nitze 1976.
6 Some interesting versions of this kind of argument are affered by Gray 1986. 7 For a good example of this kind of exploration of opportunltles on the conventional defense side, see Mako 1983. 8 See for interesting illustratlons Friedberg 1980 and Rosenberg 1981. 9 For some optimism about limiting nuclear war, see Albert 1976. 10 For a very skeptical Interpretation of the feaslbility of limltlng nuclear war, see McNamara 1983.
II SeheHing 1960 presents a lucid early discussion of t he threat that leaves something to chance here.
12 On conventionol warhead uses of high accuracies, see Ohlert 1978. 13 On the economic burdens of preparations for a purely conventional defen se, see Kaiser /Leber /Mertes/Sch ulze 1982.
14 The uncertainties of contemporary conventional war are discussed in Betts 1982. 15 On the mativatlons imputed by the bureaucratic politics madel, see Holperin 1974.
